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1Discrimination: The Law vs. Morality
But if thought corrupts language, language can also corrupt thought.
George Orwell
Do people have a right to discriminate?  That question can be 
approached at least two ways: (a) what is the legal answer and (b) 
what might be the moral answer?  The distinction is important since 
acts that are legal might not be moral and conversely those that are 
moral might not be legal.  South Africa’s apartheid was both legal 
and constitutional but morally repugnant.  During slavery in the 
U.S., assisting a runaway slave was moral but it was in violation of 
the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850.1  To approach the question of 
whether people have, or should have a right, to discriminate, we 
might begin by attempting to give the term discrimination opera-
tional meaning to avoid confusing different forms of behavior.
One legal dictionary defines discrimination as: “n.unequal 
treatment of persons, for a reason which has nothing to do with 
legal rights or ability.  Federal and state laws prohibit discrimi-
nation in employment, availability of housing, rates of pay, right 
to promotion, educational opportunity, civil rights, and use of 
facilities based on race, nationality, creed, color, age, sex or 
sexual orientation.”2  Another law dictionary defines discrimination 
1Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, Thirty-first Congress. Sess. I. 
Ch. 60. 1850.
2Gerald and Kathleen Hill, The Real Life Dictionary of the Law
(2000), [Internet Source], retrieved 7/24/03, from the world wide 
web: 
2as: “any distinction, exclusion, restriction, or preference made on 
a particular basis, such as race, sex, religion, national origin, 
marital status, pregnancy, or disability, which has the purpose or 
effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment, or 
exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, or any other 
field of life.”3That same dictionary goes on to define racial 
discrimination as: “Any act involving a distinction, exclusion, 
restriction, or preference based on race, colour, descent or na-
tional or ethnic origin, which has the purpose or effect of nullify-
ing or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal 
footing, of any human right or fundamental freedom in the political, 
economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.”4  A 
United Nations Convention Against Discrimination in Education 
defined discrimination as follows: “The term discrimination includes 
any distinction, exclusion, limitation or preference which, being 
http://Dictionary.law.com/definition2.asp?selected=532&bold=%7C%7C%7
C%7C.
3HR-Net Group Hellenic Resources Institute, Inc., “Interna-
tional Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination,”(New York: March, 1966), [Internet Source], re-
trieved 7/25/03, from the world wide web: 
http://www.hri.org/docs/ICERD66.html.
4Attorney-General’s Department.  Scale Plus Law Resource. 
“Racial Discrimination Act 1975 - Sect. 9.  Racial discrimination to 
be unlawful. (1)”  (1975), [Internet Source], retrieved 7/25/03, 
from the world wide web:  
http://scaleplus.law.gov.au/html/pasteact/0/47/0/PA000170.htm.
3based on race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, economic condition or birth, has 
the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing equality of treat-
ment.”5
While these definitions of discrimination might be useful they 
fall short of being operationally useful in the sense that they mix 
several kinds of behavior and lead to confusion.  Gains in under-
standing can be made if we simplify the definition such that one act 
is not confused with another.
Discrimination Operationally Defined
More generally, and inclusive of legal attempts to define the 
term, discrimination might be operationally defined as, the act of 
choice or selection.  All selection necessarily and simultaneously 
requires non-selection.  Choice requires discrimination.  When one 
chooses to attend the University of Chicago, he non-selects Harvard 
University as well as every other university.   When one selects a 
Bordeaux wine, he non-selects a Burgundy wine. If we wished, we 
might call these cases university discrimination and wine discrimi-
nation.  Similarly, when the term discrimination is modified with 
the nouns race and sex, we merely specify the criterion upon which 
the choice is made; instead of university and wine discrimination, 
5Vernon Van Dyke, “Human Rights Without Discrimination, The 
American Political Science Review, Vol. 67, No. 4. (Dec., 1973), p. 
1271.
4it is race and sex discrimination.
At this juncture we might ask if there is any conceptual 
distinction between discriminating for or against particular 
universities, wines, and other goods and services and discriminating 
for or against particular races and sexes?  Or should one discrimi-
nate at all?  Can one make a case for indifference or random choice 
among objects of desire?
Indifference and random choice is hardly ever the case.  Our 
lives are largely spent discriminating for or against selected 
activities, objects and people.  Some of us discriminate against 
those who have criminal records, who bathe infrequently, who use 
vulgar speech and have improper social graces.  Most of us choose 
mates within our own racial, ethnic group, or religion, hence 
discriminating against mates who, save for their race, ethnicity, 
and religion, might be just as suitable.  According to the 1992 
census, only 2.2 percent of Americans were married to someone other 
than their own race.6  There is also evidence of discrimination 
based on physical characteristics in politics: not many short men 
have been elected president of the United States.  In fact, twenty-
two out of forty-two presidents have been five feet, eleven inches 
and taller, well above the population’s average height.7   That is 
6U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1960, 1970, and 1980 Subject 
Reports on Marital Status and 1991 and 1992 Current Population 
Reports, P20, nos. 461 and 468. 
7http://www.webpresidentsusa.com/AP060303.htm
5not an expected random outcome.  Furthermore, discrimination is not 
consistent.  Sometimes people discriminate against theater 
entertainment in favor of parties, against women in favor of men; 
and at other times and circumstances the same people do the reverse.
One might be tempted to argue that racial discrimination in 
marriage does not have important social consequences, needy of a 
legal or political remedy, as other forms of racial discrimination. 
 But does have important social consequences.  When there is 
assortive (non-random) mate selection, it heightens whatever group 
differences there are in the population.8  When high I.Q. people 
marry other high I.Q. people, when high income people marry other 
high income people, and to the extent there is a racial correlation 
between these characteristics, racial discrimination in mate selec-
tion exaggerates the skewness in the population’s intelligence and 
income distribution.  There would be greater income equality if high 
I.Q. and high income people mated with low I.Q. and low income 
people.  But I imagine that most people would be horrified by the 
suggestion of a mandate to require the same.9
8Assortive or non-random selection of mating partners with 
respect to one or more characteristic is positive when like people 
mate more frequently than would be expected by chance and is nega-
tive when the reverse occurs.
9Gary S. Becker, “A Theory of Marriage: Part I,” The Journal of 
Political Economy, Vol. 81, No. 4. (Jul. - Aug., 1973), pp. 813-846. 
“Mating of likes - positive assortive mating - is extremely common, 
whether measured by intelligence, height, skin color, age, educa-
tion, family background, or religion, although unlikes sometimes 
also mate, as measured, say, by an inclination to nurture or succor, 
6It would appear that the term discrimination, defined simply as
the act of choice, is morally neutral in the sense that there are no 
unambiguous standards that permit us to argue that the choice to 
attend University of Chicago or the choice to purchase a Bordeaux 
wine is more righteous than the choice to attend Harvard University 
and purchase a Burgundy wine.  And more importantly, no argument can 
be produced for government forcing a person to select one university 
or wine over another.  Moreover, no argument can be produced to 
force people to grant equal opportunity when choosing of universi-
ties and wines.
If people are free to discriminate in favor of, or against a 
university or wine, what argument can be made against their having 
that same right with respect to choosing any other object of desire 
including the race or sex characteristics of their mates, employees, 
tenants, or club members?  If one shares the value of freedom of 
association, why should some associations be permitted and others 
denied?  If a man is not permitted to bring a court action against a 
woman who refuses to deal with him, e.g., have a dating relationship 
or to establish a marital contract for any arbitrary reason she 
chooses, what is the case for bringing court action for other 
refusals to deal with another, e.g., employment, renting or selling
a house, or club membership, for similar arbitrary reasons?
to dominate or be deferential.  This suggests that traits are 
typically but by no means always complements.” p. 827.
7Nobel Laureate Kenneth Arrow says, “There are many varieties of 
liberalism, which draw the boundaries between social and individual 
action in different places, but all agree in rejecting racial 
discrimination, by which is meant allowing racial identification to 
have a place in an individual’s life chances.”10  However, if “al-
lowing racial identification to have a place in an individual’s life 
chances” means refusal to deal, what policy recommendations emerge? 
  Refusal to deal can apply to any setting including activities like 
marriage and friendship and invitations to social gatherings, all of 
which have the possibility of affecting one’s “life chances.”   If 
refusal to deal is permitted in one activity, for any arbitrary 
reason, what case can be made for not permitting refusal to deal in 
other activities?  The practical answer to this question has more to 
do with the threat of government violence against people who refuse 
to deal in prohibited ways than any kind of internally consistent 
logic.
Preferences
In discussions on race, we hear descriptive terms and phrases 
like “discriminatory values”11 and “discriminatory tastes.”12
10Kenneth J. Arrow, “What Has Economics to Say About Racial 
Discrimination?” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol 12, No. 2 
(Spring 1998), p. 91.
11Kenneth J. Arrow, “What Has Economics to Say About Racial 
Discrimination?” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol 12, No. 2 
(Spring 1998), p. 92.
12Kenneth J. Arrow, “What Has Economics to Say About Racial 
8Sometimes the behavior in question is described as prejudice, 
defined as “Ethnic prejudice is an antipathy based upon a faulty and 
inflexible generalization.”13
For the most part, choices reflect preferences.  In economic 
theory, it is postulated that each individual has a set of prefer-
ences.  He selects a preferred set of objects of desire from his 
available alternatives.  There are no objective criteria by which 
one set of preferences can be judged as "better" or “worse” than 
another set because there are simply no commonly accepted standards 
for evaluation.  In other words, it is impossible to demonstrate 
that preferring Bordeaux wines is superior to preferring Burgundy; 
or a preference to attend the University of Chicago is superior to 
Harvard University.
Preferences are generally accepted as given.  The most that can 
be objectively determined is whether, given an opportunity set, the 
individual is optimizing.  Our reasoning about preferences suggests 
that it also applies to preferences for human attributes such as 
race, sex, nationality, religion, beauty or any other attribute.  
From a strictly analytical view, there is no conceptual distinction 
to be made between preferences for race, nationality, sex and 
preferences for universities and wine.
Discrimination?” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol 12, No. 2 
(Spring 1998), p. 95.
13Gordon W. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (Cambridge: 
Addison-Wesley, 1954), p. 9.
9     One might rejoin by asserting that racial preferences are not 
comparable to other kinds of preferences in the consequences they 
have for society and for individuals.14  The indulgence of racial 
preferences has specific effects that the indulgence of preferences 
for certain wines do not have but are the preferences basically 
different?  If so, how do they differ?  A widespread preference for 
Bordeaux wines "harms" Burgundy producers by reducing the value of 
resources held in Burgundy production. If the harmful consequences 
of preferences are generally thought of as reducing the value of 
some resources while increasing the value of others, then prefer-
ences for human physical attributes have similar effects.  One 
important, and by no means trivial, difference between preferences 
for certain racial attributes and those for wines is that the latter 
are not as specialized as the former.  If Burgundy producers see a 
widespread preference for Bordeaux wines, they might be able to 
convert their resources into Bordeaux production.  Racial attributes 
are more specialized.  That is, people who are black cannot become 
white, though this is not entirely true: one study estimated that at 
one time approximately 2,600 Negroes become white, - "pass" -each 
year.15
14See, John J. Donahue III, “Discrimination in Employment,” in 
The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, ed. Peter 
Newman (London: Macmillan Reference, Ltd., 1998). p.617.
15Eckard, E. W., “How Many Negroes Pass?,” American Journal of 
Sociology(May, 1947), pp. 498-500.
10
     The fact that racial attributes are specialized, unchangeable 
(or immutable as the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
calls them) does not place them in a class by themselves.16  Persons 
with average and higher I.Q.s are generally preferred to those with 
below-average I.Q.s; persons who are not physically disabled are 
preferred to those who are; non-stutterers are preferred to stutter-
ers; women with attractive features are preferred to those who are 
unattractive. In each of these cases, and many others, the 
less-preferred attribute is unchangeable.  In each case the 
less-preferred person might suffer a competitive disadvantage in 
some arenas.  Disadvantage and advantage are the inevitable conse-
quences of differences in individual tastes, abilities, and traits, 
and freedom of choice in a free society.
     Human preferences, whether for physical attributes, such as
race, or for other objects of desire such as food, child rearing 
practices, alcohol consumption, addictive drugs or entertainment can 
have a moral dimension.  There might be a moral consensus condemning 
preferences for forms of entertainment such as pornographic movies; 
there might also be a moral consensus that condemns certain race and 
sex preferences.  The fact of a consensus on what constitutes moral 
or immoral preferences does not alter the fact that people do 
16The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, “Race-
Related Characteristics and Conditions,” (2002), [Internet Source], 
retrieved 7/24/03, from the world wide web: 
http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/fs-race.html.
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exhibit preferences and there is no commonly agreed upon standard by 
which we can objectively decide whether one set of preferences is 
more moral or righteous than another.  Moreover, there is no objec-
tive standard or proof that neutral or indifferent racial prefer-
ences should be held with respect to any association be it: dating 
and marriage, or employment and renting.  Law professor, Larry 
Alexander, differs saying, “Where harmful social effects will ensue 
from bias, given the numbers and group characteristics, there is 
probably a case for legally prohibiting biased choices in certain 
realms otherwise left to private choice, particularly the economic 
realm. . . .  There is therefore less reason to believe there is a 
moral right to make biased choices when they produce harmful conse-
quences, even within a framework that meets the minimum standards of 
justice.”17 Alexander goes on to conclude: “In short, in an 
otherwise just society, discriminatory preferences are intrinsically 
morally wrong if premised on error, moral or factual, about the 
dispreferred.  Discriminatory preferences are extrinsically morally 
wrong if their social costs are large relative to the costs of 
eliminating or frustrating them.  And if a discriminatory preference 
is morally wrong--and if there is no moral right that protects its 
exercise--then there is a case for legally prohibiting its exercise 
if the costs of legal prohibition and enforcement are low relative 
17Larry Alexander, “What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? 
Biases, Preferences, Stereotypes, and Proxies,” University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 141 (November, 1992), p. 163.
12
to the social gains to be achieved.”18
Another legal scholar carries the argument against preference 
indulgence a step further, arguing the unfairness inherent in the 
legal requirement that litigants should bear the burden of proving 
that the plaintiff intentionally discriminated against him.  Charles 
R. Lawrence argues that individuals living in a racist society 
unconsciously discriminate without even knowing it because of 
stereotypes and attitudes that dwell deeply in their psyches.19
Prejudice
In much of the racial literature, prejudice is usually seen as 
suspicion, intolerance or an irrational hatred of other races.  
Sometimes prejudice is seen oppression as suggested by law professor 
Khiara M. Bridges when he says, “Therefore, if racial prejudice, the 
subordination of people of color, and White supremacy persist, they 
do so largely because the legal system sanctions them.”20  Other 
times prejudice is seen as racial preferences as implied by Justice 
O’Connor, writing for the majority Adarand Contractors, Inc. v. Pena
(1995), striking down a government set-aside “[B]ecause that 
18Larry Alexander, “What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? 
Biases, Preferences, Stereotypes, and Proxies,” University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 141 (November, 1992), p. 219.
19
Charles R. Lawrence, “The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection: 
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism,” 39 Stanford Law Review(1987) p. 
328ff. 
20Khiara M. Bridges “Note on the Commodification of the Black 
Female Body: The Critical Implications of the Alienability of Fetal 
Tissue,” Columbia Law Review, 102 (January, 2002), p. 143.
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perception-especially when fostered by the Congress of the United 
States -can only exacerbate rather than reduce racial prejudice, it 
will delay the time when race will become a truly irrelevant, or at 
least insignificant, factor.”21
These visions of prejudice expose analysts to the pitfalls of 
making ambiguous statements and advancing faulty arguments.  A 
useful operational definition of prejudice can be found by examining 
its Latin root (praejudicium) meaning “to judge before the facts are 
known.”   Thus, we might define prejudicial acts as: decision-making 
on the basis of incomplete information.
Decision-making on the basis of incomplete information is 
necessary and to be expected in a world of scarcity, uncertainty, 
complexity and costly information.  Another common experience is 
erroneous interpretation of information.  Furthermore, different 
individuals might arrive at different interpretations even if 
confronted with the same information.  Also, different people reach 
different decisions on just what constitutes the optimal quantity of 
information to gather prior to making decisions.
      Consider a simple, yet intuitively appealing, example of how 
decisions might be made on the basis of incomplete information (and 
possibly erroneous interpretation of evidence).  Suppose a fully 
grown tiger suddenly appeared in a room.  A reliable prediction is 
21Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena (1995) 115 S.Ct. 2097, p. 
243.
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that most individuals would endeavor to leave the area with great 
dispatch.  Such a response to the tiger's presence is not likely to 
be based on detailed information about the behavioral characteris-
tics of that particular tiger.  The response is more likely to be 
based upon one's stock of information held about tigers as a class. 
 The individual pre-judges; we might say he employs stereotypes.  He 
is not likely to seek additional information because he calculates 
that the expected cost of an additional unit of information about 
that tiger, such as talking to or petting him, is likely to exceed 
the expected benefit.  He simply ascribes known or surmised group 
characteristics to the individual tiger.
     Most often when people use the words prejudice and stereotype, 
they are pejorative judgements to refer to those whose chosen 
quantity of information, for decision-making, is deemed too small by 
the observer.  However, what constitutes the optimal quantity of 
information collected before decisions are made is subjectively 
determined by the individual's calculation of his costs and bene-
fits.
     Information is not costless.  To acquire an additional unit of 
information requires a sacrifice of time, effort, or other re-
sources.  Thus, people seek to economize on information cost.  In 
doing so people tend to substitute less costly forms of information 
for more costly forms.  Physical attributes are cheap-to-observe. If 
a particular physical attribute is perceived as correlated with a 
15
more costly-to-observe attribute, then people might use that physi-
cal attribute as an estimator or proxy for the more 
costly-to-observe attribute.  The cheaply observed fact that an 
individual is short, an amputee, a black, or a woman provides what 
some people deem sufficient information for decision-making or 
predicting the presence of some other more costly to observe attrib-
ute.  For example, if asked to identify individuals with doctorate 
degrees in physics only by observing race and sex, most of us would 
assign a higher probability that white or Asian males would have 
such degrees than black males or women.  Such behavior is what 
decision theory expects where an unobservable attribute must be 
estimated from an observable one.
Stereotyping and prejudging can be independent of preferences. 
 Observing a person’s decision-making behavior permits us to say 
nothing unambiguous about that person’s personal preferences with 
regard to race, sex, ethnicity and nationality.
A simple example can demonstrate this.  Imagine the reader is 
on a particular university campus.  He is offered: pick a five-
person basketball team from a group of twenty students.  The group 
consists of five black males, five white males, five black females 
and five white females.  He has zero information about their 
basketball proficiency and they are otherwise indistinguishable 
except by race and sex.  That is, they are identical in terms of 
other physical characteristics: weight, height, etc.  He is offered 
16
that if his selected team wins the basketball game, he wins a 
$10,000 prize.  Assuming that the person’s objective is to maximize 
his winnings, he would probably find his selection dominated by 
black males.
What can an observer, watching that person’s choices, say about 
his race or sex preferences?  There is absolutely nothing unambigu-
ous that can be said about the person’s racial or sex preferences 
simply by observing choices based on race and sex.  Moreover, a 
person having antipathy against blacks would select in the identical 
fashion so long as maximizing winnings dominated his objective. 
Furthermore, given the high correlation between race, sex and 
basketball proficiency, would anyone care if a racial preference for 
white males were indulged by the chooser?  He would personally bear 
the cost of preference indulgence.
Physical characteristics can be used as proxies for other   
costly to observe characteristics.  Some racial and ethnic groups 
have higher incidence and mortality from various diseases than the 
national average.  In 1998, rates of death from cardiovascular 
diseases were about 30 percent higher among black adults than among 
white adults.  Cervical cancer rates were five times higher among 
Vietnamese women in the U.S. than among white women.  Pima Indians 
of Arizona have the highest known diabetes rates in the world.22
22Diabetes Foundation of Mississippi, Inc., “High Risk Group -
Native Americans Prevalence” [Internet Source], retrieved 7/24/03, 
from the world wide web: 
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Prostate cancer is nearly twice as common among black men as white 
men.23
Whether genetics, environment, or some other factor accounts 
for the association between race and some diseases, it is undeniable 
that such an association exists.  As such it means that a physical 
characteristic such as race can be used as a proxy for the 
probability of some other characteristic such as prostate cancer, 
and cervical cancer. As such health providers can assess patient 
screening needs.
Racial Indicators
One might take the position that while it is legitimate for 
doctors to use race or ethnicity as indicators of the higher proba-
bility of certain diseases, it is not legitimate to use race or 
ethnicity as indicators for worker productivity, criminal behavior 
or basketball proficiency. Other than simply stating that it is 
acceptable to use race or ethnicity as information acquisition 
technique in the case of medicine and not in other areas of life, is 
there really a difference?  Surely, race and ethnicity are not 
perfect indicators of the risk of prostate cancer or hypertension 
and neither are they perfect indicators of SAT scores, criminal 
http://www.msdiabetes.org/nativeamericans.html.
23University of Maryland Medicine, “Urological Disorders. 
Prostate Cancer” May, 2003), [Internet Source], retrieved 7/24/03, 
from the world wide web: http://2g.isg.syssrc.com/urolology-
info/proscan.htm.
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behavior, basketball or football playing or sprinting proficiency;  
however, there are concrete factual data that surely indicates 
associations.  For example: In 2002 the average black score on the 
combined math and verbal portions of the SAT test was 857.  The 
average white score on the combined math and verbal SAT was 17 
percent higher at 1060.24  While blacks are 13 percent of the 
population, they are 80 percent of professional basketball players 
and 65 percent of professional football players.  Blacks who trace 
their ancestry to West Africa, including black Americans, hold more 
than 95 percent of the top times in sprinting.25  For the crime of 
homicide, over the years 1976-2000 blacks, 13 percent of the general 
population, were 51.5 percent of the offenders, whites were 46.4 
percent and others two percent.26
Using race as an indicator does not necessarily tell us any-
thing about the chooser’s racial preferences.  The Washington 
Lawyers’  Committee filed a lawsuit in April 2001 on behalf of Mr. 
Bryan Greene, a black man, against Your Way Taxicab Company for 
24
“Latest News: The Expanding Racial Scoring Gap Between Black 
and White SAT Test Takers,” The Journal of Blacks in Higher Educa-
tion  (2002), [Internet Source], retrieved 7/24/03, from the world 
wide web: www.jbhe.com/latest/37_b&w_sat.html).
25Jon Entine, Taboo: Why Black Athletes Dominate Sports and Why 
We Are Afraid to Talk about It.  (New York: Public Affairs, 2000), 
p. 31.
26U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 
“Homicide Trends in the U.S. Trends by Race,”  (2002), [Internet 
Source], retrieved 7/24/03, from the world wide web: 
http://www.ojp.gov/bjs/homicide/race.htm#ovrelrace.
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violations of 42 U.S.C. sec. 1981, and the District of Columbia’s 
Human Rights Act that prohibit discrimination in the making of 
contracts.  As Mr. Greene approached a hotel entrance, the doorman 
was assisting a customer out of a Your Way Taxicab.  The doorman saw 
Mr. Greene and attempted to hold the cab for him; however, when the 
driver saw Mr. Greene he sped away.  After mediation, Your Way 
Taxicab Company reached an out of court settlement.27
In a number of cities there have been similar complaints by 
blacks of similar behavior by taxicab drivers.  The question we 
might ask; are the driver’s decisions based upon racial preferences 
or might they fear being asked to go into a neighborhood where there 
is a high probability of being robbed, assaulted, or murdered? By 
simply knowing that a driver refused a black we cannot make an 
unambiguous statement about whether the decision was motivated by 
racial preferences or not.
Evidence that driver decisions might very well be based on 
criteria other than racial preferences is seen in a 1999 story 
written by James Owens titled “Capital Cabbies Salute Race Profil-
ing.”  In the story James Owens says28
27Washington Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights and Urban 
Affairs, “Washington Lawyers; Committee Update. Vol. 9, No. 1.  
Public Accommodations. Taxicab Discrimination.” (Spring 2003), 
[internet source], retrieved 7/24/03, from the world wide web:     
http://www.washlaw.org/news/update/public accommodations spring 
2003.htm
28James Owens, “Capital Cabbies Salute Race Profiling,” (1999), 
[Internet Source], retrieved 7/24/03, from the world wide web: 
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If racial profiling is “racism,”  then the cab drivers of 
Washington, D.C., they themselves mainly blacks and Hispanics, 
are all for it.  A District taxicab commissioner, Sandra 
Seegars, who is black, issued a safety-advice statement urging 
D.C.’s 6,800 cabbies to refuse to pick up “dangerous looking” 
passengers. She described “dangerous looking” as a “young black 
guy. . . with shirttail hanging down longer than his coat, 
baggy pants, unlaced tennis shoes,” etc.  That’s one typical 
description - but the cabbies know, from fear-filled 
experience, about many other “looks” of black-male threat, 
especially at night.  She also warned cabbies to stay away from 
low-income black neighborhoods (which comprise much of 
Washington, D.C.).  Her action was triggered by the most recent 
murder of a cabbie in Southeast Washington.”
Another example of race as an indicator is seen in the case 
where   residents in Southwest Washington filed suit in U.S. 
District Court after Domino’s Pizzas repeatedly refused to make door 
deliveries in certain neighborhoods and instead made customers meet 
drivers at the curbside to pay and receive their delivery orders.  
The lawsuit alleged racial discrimination by Domino's Pizza Inc., 
and Team Washington Inc., a company that operates more than 50 
Domino's stores.  According to the plaintiffs, Domino's delivers to 
the door in Georgetown and other mostly white areas of Northwest 
Washington.  The suit also alleged that deliverymen engaged in 
similar delivery decisions in Southeast Washington's Potomac 
Gardens, where another customer filed a bias lawsuit.  Again, the 
question is were the drivers indulging their racial preferences or 
acting out of fear of assault or robbery.
According to Pizza Marketing Quarterly, similar charges of 
http://home.netcom.com/~owensva/cabbie.html.
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racial discrimination were levied in St. Louis, Missouri against 
Papa Johns pizza delivery.   Cathy Juengel, a St. Louis Papa John's 
district manager, said she could not and would not ask her drivers 
to put their lives on the line.  She added that the racial discrimi-
nation accusation is false because 75 to 85 percent of the drivers 
in the complaining neighborhood are black and, moreover, most of 
those drivers lived in the very neighborhood being denied delivery 
service.29
Public Policy
If one assumes that racial preferences against blacks drives a 
particular decision, then he is likely to call for policy like that 
of the San Francisco Board of Supervisors.  After a pizza 
deliveryman was shot and killed in a San Francisco housing project, 
Domino’s suspended pizza deliveries in the highest crime areas of 
the city.  In response, the San Francisco Board of Supervisors 
enacted an ordinance making it illegal for Domino's (or any other 
fast-food deliverer) to refuse to deliver in areas the company 
believes would put its employees' lives in danger.
One seriously doubts that racial preferences against blacks was 
the motivating force behind Domino’s delivery policy but by the 
actions taken by the San Francisco Board of Supervisors one would 
29Stephen Rosamond, “What do you Say or Do in a Public Rela-
tions NIGHTMARE,” PMQ Pizza Marketing Quarterly, [Internet Source], 
retrieved 7/24/03, from the world wide web: 
http://www.pmq.com/pr_nightmare.shtml.
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reach that conclusion.  Similarly, decisions made by taxicab drivers 
not to cruise high crime areas, or pick up passengers that drivers 
surmise are destined to high crime areas, cannot be unambiguously 
interpreted as negative racial preferences for blacks.
There is no question that law-abiding black citizens are 
offended by, and bear the cost of, taxicabs passing them up only to 
pick up a white passenger down the street or not having pizza 
deliveries on the same terms as white customers.  They are treated 
unequally through no fault of their own.  But policy should not be 
based on moral indignation against what is seen as an injustice, 
calculating only benefits; the costs should enter the calculation as 
well.  That means we should confront the question of how many pizza 
deliveries are worth how many injured, robbed or dead pizza 
deliverymen?  Confronting the real-world options this way might 
cause policymakers to focus attention away from charges of prefer-
ences against blacks to the real villains of the piece - namely 
those blacks who have made black and high crime perceived as being 
synonymous.
What Lawyers Say
The canonical idea of "anti-discrimination" in the United 
States condemns the differential treatment of otherwise similarly 
situated individuals on the basis of race, sex, national origin, or 
other protected characteristics.  “Statutes prohibiting racial 
discrimination in public accommodations, employment, or the housing 
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market are by now reasonably uncontroversial.”30  Not all legal 
scholars agree: “Forced associations are in principle no better than 
legal prohibitions against voluntary associations.”31Indeed, the 
true test of one’s commitment to freedom of expression does not come 
when one permits others the freedom to express ideas with which he 
agrees. The true test comes when one permits others to express ideas 
he finds offensive.  The same test applies to one’s commitment to 
freedom of association, namely when he permits others to associate 
in ways he deems offensive.  “An antidiscrimination law is the 
antithesis of freedom of contract, a principle that allows all 
persons to do business with whomever they please for good reason, 
bad reason, or no reason at all. . . . By its nature the 
antidiscrimination principle is interventionist.32
Freedom of Association vs. Forced Association
Consider the case of Mildred, a Negro woman, and Richard P. 
Loving, a white man, Virginia residents who traveled to Washington, 
D.C. in June 1958, and were married pursuant to its laws.  Later, 
30Robert J. Cottrol, “The Long Lingering Shadow: Law, Liberal-
ism, and Cultures of Racial Hierarchy and Identity in the Americas,” 
Tulane Law Review, Vol. 76, No. 11 (November 2001), p. 21.
31Richard A. Epstein, Forbidden Grounds: The Case Against 
Employment Discrimination Laws (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1992), p. 142.
32Richard A. Epstein, Forbidden Grounds: The Case Against 
Employment Discrimination Laws (University of Chicago Press, 1992), 
p. 3-4.
24
when they returned to Virginia, the grand jury of the Circuit Court 
of Caroline County issued an indictment charging the Lovings with 
violating Virginia’s ban on interracial marriages.  Specifically, 
Section 20-58 of the Virginia Code: ”Leaving state to evade law.---
If any white person and colored person shall go out of this State, 
for the purpose of being married, and with the intention of return-
ing, and be married out of it, and afterwards return and reside in 
it, cohabiting as man and wife, they shall be punished as provided 
in Section 20-59, and the marriage shall be governed by the same law 
as if it has been solemnized in this State.  The fact of their 
cohabitation here as man and wife shall be evidence of their mar-
riage.”  Section 20-59 provides: “Punishment for marriage.--- If any 
white person intermarry with a colored person, or any colored person 
intermarry with a white person, he shall be guilty of a felony and 
shall be punished by confinement in the penitentiary for not less 
than one nor more than five years.”
On January 6, 1959, the Lovings pleaded guilty to violating 
Virginia’s antimiscegenation laws and were sentenced to one year in 
jail; however, the trial judge offered to suspend the sentence for a 
period of 25 years on the condition that the Lovings leave the State 
and not return to Virginia together for 25 years.  The Virginia 
Supreme Court of Appeals upheld the decision and the constitutional-
ity of Virginia’s antimiscegenation statutes.  The Lovings success-
fully challenged the constitutionality of Virginia’s 
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antimiscegenation statues before the U.S. Supreme Court in Richard 
Perry Loving et ux. v. Virginia.33
33Richard Perry Loving et us., Appellants, v. Virginia 388 US1, 
18 L ed 2d 1010, 87S Ct 1817, Argued April 10, 1967.  Decided June 
12, 1967. [Internet Source], retrieved 7/24/03, from the world wide 
web: http://www.ameasite.org/loving.asp.
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Today, most Americans accept interracial marriages.  According 
to a 1994 survey conducted by the National Opinion Research Center, 
nearly three-quarters of Americans would not favor laws banning 
interracial marriages.34   Most Americans would agree that a law 
prohibiting interracial marriage is a gross violation of freedom of
contract or association; however, a law mandating interracial 
marriage would be no less offensive to freedom of contract and 
association.  As Richard Epstein said, “Forced associations are in 
principle no better than legal prohibitions against voluntary 
associations.”35   It would appear that we could generalize that any 
prohibition against association or any mandate to associate are 
equally offensive to basic human rights.
Recently, the all-male policy of Augusta National Golf Club, 
the home of the Masters Tournament, has come under considerable 
criticism.  Whether one approves or disapproves of the Club’s 
decision not to admit women as members, the more important issue is 
whether it would violate civil rights if the Club were mandated to 
do so.  In reasoning about this matter, it would seem that an answer 
to a very simple question would help us:  Does a person have a 
34The National Opinion Research Center, “1972-1974 General 
Social Survey Cumulative File,”  (1994), [Internet Source], 
retrieved 7/24/03, from the world wide web:
http://ist-socrates.berkeley.edu:7502/GSS/Doc/gss008.html#racmar.
35Richard A. Epstein, Forbidden Grounds: The Case Against 
Employment Discrimination Laws (University of Chicago Press, 1992), 
p. 3-4.
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property right entitling them to do business with an unwilling buyer 
or seller?  It would appear that the answer is an unambiguous no.   
 The essence of a property right is the unrestricted liberty to 
decide with whom you shall share, or exclude from those things or 
activities that are deemed yours.  Clearly, those who are offended 
by the Augusta National Golf Club’s sexually discriminatory prac-
tices are free to exercise their own property rights by refusing to 
do business with the club or its membership and use their free 
speech rights to try to persuade others to do the same.  That is 
consistent with basic civil rights; however, by using the coercive 
powers of the state to forcibly deprive the Club members of its 
right to exclude whomever it chooses to exclude, for whatever 
reason, we descend closer to the totalitarian state.36
Racial Segregation
The legal literature is steeped with ambiguous usage of racial 
segregation.  A small sample follows.
Yale University professor Robert A Burt says:
Residential segregation was the dominant instrument for 
regulating social interactions between blacks and whites in 
the North. Segregated schools, for instance, were the norm 
in both North and South, but whereas Southern school 
segregation involved busing white and black students from 
their adjacent homes to separate, racially designated 
schools, Northern school segregation was accomplished by 
assigning students to schools within their own racially 
36Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School, “42 USC '
2000a (e)” (15 Am. Jur. 2d, ' 35), Civil Rights [Internet Source], 
retrieved 7/26/03, from the world wide web:
http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/42/2000a.html.
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segregated neighborhoods.37
Michelle Adams says:
Triggered by "systematic avoidance" of interracial con-
tact, white migration from urban public schools is a 
perceptible phenomenon, and public schools in metropolitan 
areas are increasingly becoming racially segregated.38
Elizabeth S. Anderson says,
Segregation is therefore a proper target of direct   
remediation, whether it is de facto or de jure, whether 
caused by prior illegal discrimination or not. . . . 
Racial segregation in the institutions of American civil 
society operates at three main levels: residential, educa-
tional, and occupational. Residential segregation is the 
norm for most African Americans.  According to a study 
based on 1980 census results, in the thirty metropolitan 
areas containing a majority of all blacks in the United 
States, sixty-eight percent of blacks would have to move 
to achieve a uniform racial composition across the metro-
politan area.39
Finally, Leland Ware says:
The Neighborhood Schools Act is an unlawful obstacle to 
the goal of equal educational opportunities.  It will 
reinforce racial and economic isolation by disregarding 
the effects of residential segregation.  Proponents of 
neighborhood schools did not consider the legacy of racial 
segregation that is reflected in current residential 
patterns.  They erroneously assumed that families have 
37Robert A. Burt, “Liberals’ Labors Lost.  Robert A. Burt on the 
passage and aftermath of the watershed 1968 Civil Rights Act,” Legal 
Affairs. The Magazine at the Intersection of Law and Life. [Internet 
Source], retrieved 7/26/03, from the world wide web: 
http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/January-February-2003/story burt 
janfeb2003.html.
3882 1089 Boston University Law Review December, 2002 
Intergroup Rivalry, Anti-competitive Conduct and Affirmative Action.
39Elizabeth S. Anderson, “Integration, Affirmative Action and 
Strict Scrutiny,” New York University Law Review (November, 2002), 
p. 1197.
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exercised a choice in deciding where they reside and, 
therefore, a choice as to which schools their children 
will attend.40
The way the term segregation is used in these statements is 
quite common but nonetheless confusing and thus gives rise to fuzzy 
thinking.  Consider the following hypothetical.  Blacks are about 65 
percent of the Washington, D.C. population.  Reagan National Airport 
serves the Washington, D.C. area and like every airport it has water 
fountains.  At no time have I seen anything close to blacks being 65 
percent of water fountain users.  It is a wild guess but the writer 
speculates that at most five or ten percent of the users are black. 
 To the extent that this observation approximates reality would 
anyone move to declare that Reagan National Airport water fountains 
are racially segregated?  Casual observation of ice hockey games 
would suggest that the percentage attendance of blacks are by no 
means proportional to their numbers in the general population; a 
similar observation can be made about opera attendees, dressage 
performances and wine tastings.  The population statistics of states 
such as South Dakota, Iowa, Maine, Montana and Vermont show that not 
even one percent of their populations are black.  On the other hand, 
in states such as Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi, blacks are 
over-represented. Would anyone use racial segregation to account for 
these observations?
4020 Delaware Lawyer Fall, 2002 Feature Redlining Learners: 
Delaware’s Neighborhood Schools Act.
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Just because blacks are not proportionately represented in some 
activity, according to their numbers in the general population, how 
analytically useful is to assert that the activity is racially 
segregated, at least in ordinary usage of the term.  It seems that a 
more useful test to determine whether an activity is racially 
segregated or not is to see whether, for example, if a black person 
is at Reagan National Airport, is he free to drink at any water 
foundation he chooses.  If the answer is in the affirmative, then 
the water fountains are not segregated, and that would be true even 
if a black person never uses the water fountains.
The identical test applies to the question of school segrega-
tion.  If a black student lives within a particular school district, 
is he free to attend that school?  If he can, then the school is not 
segregated, even if not a single black attends that school.  The 
same test applies to determining whether ice hockey games, operas, 
wine tastings, housing and other activities are racially segregated 
or not.
At one time there was racial segregation. If a black wanted to 
use a water fountain, he was denied, often by law, and similarly 
prohibited by law from attending certain schools because of race.  
Today none of that is true, and that means there is no school 
segregation.  When an activity is not racially mixed today, a better 
word for it is racially homogeneous, which does not mean that it is 
racially segregated.  It would surely be deemed ridiculous, fool-
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hardy and a gross abuse of government power if, for example, one 
where to conclude that since blacks do not use Reagan National 
Airport fountains according to their numbers in the general popula-
tion we should order the busing of blacks from water fountains where 
they are over-represented to those where they are under-represented. 
 Similarly, I doubt whether one would propose compelling blacks to 
move from Georgia to Iowa and the reverse for whites until there was 
some sort of preconceived notion of what constitutes racial integra-
tion across states.
Government-subsidized Preference Indulgence
People do have racial preferences but there is no evidence that 
suggests that they will indulge those preferences at any cost. 
However, public policy can lower the cost of preference indulgence, 
thereby giving people inducement to indulge them more.  In general, 
any law that fixes prices lowers the cost of preference indulgence. 
 Let us explore a hypothetical and then discuss some actual 
examples.
It is a fairly safe prediction that, holding all else constant, 
most people prefer filet mignon to chuck steak.  While filet mignon 
is preferred to chuck steak, chuck steak has no problem selling.  It 
would be a simple task to get more people to indulge their prefer-
ences for filet mignon and discriminate against the consumption of 
chuck steak.  One would only have to fix the price of chuck steak so 
that it was equal to or close to the price of filet mignon.
32
Suppose initially chuck steak sold for $4 a pound and filet 
mignon $10. Even though chuck steak is less-preferred, it sells 
because it can offer buyers a “compensating difference.”  That is, 
in effect chuck steak offers the buyer $6, the difference in price 
between it and filet mignon.  It costs buyers $6 to indulge their 
preferences for filet mignon.
However, if it were established by law that both filet mignon 
and chuck steak sell for the same price, say $10 a pound, chuck 
steak could not offer a compensating difference.  The cost of 
indulging one’s preference for filet mignon would be zero, the 
difference in price. A basic postulate of economic theory says that 
the lower the cost indulging one’s preference for an object of 
desire, the more one can expect to see people doing it.
Minimum Wage Law
The Fair Labor Standards Act establishes minimum wage, overtime 
pay, record-keeping, and child labor standards affecting workers in 
the private sector and in Federal, State, and local governments.  
The current minimum wage is $5.15 an hour.  While Congress can 
legislate that no matter whom an employer hires he must be paid 
$5.15 an hour, Congress cannot mandate that the value of an em-
ployee’s hourly output be in fact worth $5.15.
The minimum wage discriminates against the less preferred 
worker.  One component of being less-preferred has to do with worker 
productivity.   That is, employers will view it as a losing economic 
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proposition to hire a worker who is so unfortunate as to have skills 
that allow him to produce only $4 worth of value an hour and pay him 
$5.15.  Another measure of less-preferred from a particular em-
ployer’s point of view might be the race of the employee.  If an 
employer is forced to pay $5.15 an hour to no matter whom he hires, 
and both an equally productive white worker and a black worker show 
up for the job, then there is no economic criteria for selection.  
Thus, the employer will use non-economic criteria.  One of those 
non-economic criteria might be the race of the employee.  If the 
employer prefers white workers to black workers, the cost of indulg-
ing that preference, like in the steak example above, will be zero.
The minimum wage law is one of the most effective tools in the 
arsenal of racists everywhere.  During South Africa’s apartheid era 
white workers supported wage regulation.  White unionists "argued 
that in absence of statutory minimum wages, employers found it 
profitable to supplant highly trained (and usually highly paid) 
Europeans by less efficient but cheaper non-whites."41   In fact, 
"equal pay for equal work" became the rallying slogan of the white 
labor movement.  Keir Hardie, a British labor leader was greeted 
with rotten eggs, during his visit to South Africa in 1907, because 
he advocated equality between whites and Indians.  "He was after-
wards allowed to speak, however, when the workers found that he 
41G. V. Doxey, The Industrial Colour Bar in South Africa (Lon-
don:  Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 112.
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believed in 'equal pay for equal work' regardless of colour or 
creed."42
One South African union leader lamented, "There is no job 
reservation left in the building industry, and in the circumstances 
I support the rate for the job [minimum wages] as the second best 
way of protecting our white artisans."43
When Frederick Creswell became Minister of Labour, he intro-
duced the Wage Bill of 1925, saying:  "If our civilization is going 
to subsist we look upon it as necessary that our industries should 
be guided so that they afford any men desiring to live according to 
the European standards greater opportunities of doing so, and we 
must set our face against the encouragement of employment merely 
because it is cheap and the wage unit is low."44
The Economic and Wage Commission of 1925 responded to the Wage 
Bill, saying:
While definite exclusion of the Natives from the more 
remunerative fields of employment by law has not been 
urged upon us, the same result would follow a certain 
use of the powers of the Wage Board under the Wage 
Act of 1925, or of other wage-fixing legislation.  
The method would be to fix a minimum rate for an 
42Edward Roux, Time Longer Than Rope:  A History of the Black
Man's Struggle for Freedom in South Africa(Madison, Wisconsin:  The 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1964), p. 125.
43G.M.E. Leistner and W.J. Breytenbach, The Black Worker of 
South Africa(Pretoria, South Africa: The African Institute, 1975), 
p. 28.
44Doxey, The Industrial Colour Bar, p. 155.
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occupation or craft so high that no Native would be 
likely to be employed.  Even the exceptional Native 
whose efficiency would justify his employment at the 
high rate, would be excluded by the pressure of pub-
lic opinion, which makes it difficult to retain a 
Native in an employment mainly reserved for Europe-
ans.45
Sheila T. van der Horst's findings tend to support the Commis-
sion's conclusions:  "Neither the Industrial Conciliation Act nor 
the Wage Act permits differential rates to be laid down on the 
ground of race.  Consequently, where Non-Europeans, in practice 
principally the Cape Coloured, are employed as artisans they are 
subject to the same statutory minimum rates as Europeans.  Wage 
legislation of the type has tended to restrict the openings for the 
less capable workmen and particularly for Non-Europeans as they are 
prevented from offsetting lack of skill by accepting lower wage 
rates."46
In the 1930's white workers approved of the Wage Board's 
efforts to extend statutory minimum wages to nonwhites.  Broydell, 
the Labour Party Minister for Posts and Telegraphs, explained that 
whites were being ousted from jobs by "unfair competition", particu-
larly by the Indians in Natal.  Broydell urged that employers be 
45Doxey, The Industrial Colour Bar, p. 155.
46Sheila T. van der Horst, "Labour", in Handbook on Race Rela-
tions in South Africa, ed., Ellen Hellman (New York: Octagon Books, 
1975), pp. 133-34.
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forced to pay Indians the same wages they pay whites.47
Identical discriminatory forces were at work in the U.S.  In 
1909, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen called a strike against 
the Georgia Railroad.  One of their demands called for the complete 
elimination of blacks from the railroad.  Instead of elimination, 
the arbitration board decided that black firemen, hostlers and 
hostlers' helpers be paid wages equal to the wages of white men 
doing the same job.  The white unionists were delighted with the 
decision, saying, "If this course of action is followed by the 
company and the incentive for employing the Negro thus removed, the 
strike will not have been in vain.”48
The power of wage regulation to promote racially discriminatory 
ends is also seen by the famous Washington agreement between the 
Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen and the Southern Railroad Associa-
tion, signed in Washington, D. C. in January 1910:
No larger percentage of Negro firemen or yardmen will be em-
ployed in any division or in any yard than was employed on 
January 1, 1910.  If on any roads this percentage is now larger 
than on January 1, 1910, this agreement does not contemplate 
the discharge of any Negroes to be replaced by whites; but as 
vacancies are filled or new men are employed, whites are to be 
taken until the percentage of January first is again reached.49
47Merle Lipton, Capitalism and Apartheid:  South Africa, 
1910-84 (New Jersey:  Rowman & Allanheld Publishers, 1985), p. 189.
48Sterling D. Spero and Abram Harris, The Black Worker  (New 
York:  Kennikat Press, 1931), p. 291.
49Sterling D. Spero and Abram Harris, The Black Worker (New 
York:  Kennikat Press, 1931), p. 291.
37
That part of the Washington agreement was followed by:
Negroes are not to be employed as baggagemen, flagmen or yard 
foremen, but in any case in which they are now so employed, 
they are not to be discharged to make places for whites, but 
when the positions they occupy become vacant, whites shall be 
employed in their places.50
The Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen, like their union brothers in 
South Africa, recognized that, "Where no difference in the rates of 
pay between white and colored exists, the restrictions as to the 
percentage of Negroes to be employed does not apply."51
This section of the Washington agreement reaches the same 
conclusion reached by South Africa's Mine Workers Union in 1919, 
when it said:
The real point on that is that whites are being ousted by 
colored labour . . . It is now a question of cheap labour 
versus what is called "dear labor", and we consider we will 
have to ask the commission to use the word "colour" in the 
absence of a minimum wage, but when that [minimum wage] is 
introduced we believe that most of the difficulties in regard 
to the coloured question will automatically drop out.52
Both the U. S. Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen and the South African 
Mine Workers Union recognized the power of wage regulations as a 
means to accomplish racist goals.  They both saw that setting a 
floor on wages could be more effective and politically cheaper than 
50Sterling D. Spero and Abram Harris, The Black Worker (New 
York:  Kennikat Press, 1931), p. 291.
51Sterling D. Spero and Abram Harris, The Black Worker (New 
York:  Kennikat Press, 1931), p. 291.
52Frederick A. Johnstone, Class, Race and Gold:  A Study of
Class Relations and Racial Discrimination in South Africa (London:  
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976), p. 158.
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the imposition of quotas and color bars in part because they are 
seldom seen as racially discriminatory and hence are more politi-
cally acceptable among decent people (even among those victimized by 
it) and less subject to constitutional challenge.
Super Minimum Wages
The Davis-Bacon Act, written in 1931, as amended, is still law 
today.  Its provisions mandate the payment of "prevailing" wages for 
the various construction trades in all federally financed, or 
assisted, construction contracts.  The Secretary of Labor sets the 
prevailing wage as the union wage or higher.  As such the Davis-
Bacon Act has the same racial effect that minimum wages have, albeit 
a super-minimum wage.
The desire for the racial effect was expressed by its congres-
sional supporters. Congressman Allgood said:
That contractor has cheap colored labor that he transports, and 
he puts them in cabins, and it is labor of that sort that is in 
competition with white labor throughout the country.53
In support of Senator Bacon's bill, Congressman Upshaw complained of 
the "superabundance or large aggregation of negro labor," which is a 
real problem "you are confronted with in any community."54   In 
response to Senator Bacon's description of a construction project in 
53U. S. Congress, House, Congressional Record, 71st Congress, 
3rd Session, 1931, p. 6513.
54Hours of Labor and Wages on Public Works, Hearings before the 
Committee on Labor, House of Representatives, 69th Congress, 2nd 
Session, February 28, 1927, p. 3.
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his district, Representative Upshaw of Georgia remarked:
You will not think a southern man is more than human if he 
smiles over the fact of your reaction to the real problem you 
are confronted with in any community with a superabundance or 
aggregation of Negro labor.55
To which Senator Bacon replied:
I just mentioned the fact because that was the fact in this 
particular case, but the same would be true if you should bring 
in a lot of Mexican laborers or if you brought in any non-union 
laborers from any other state.56
Congressman John J. Cochran of Missouri echoed similar sentiments, 
saying he had "received numerous complaints in recent months about 
southern contractors employing low-paid colored mechanics getting 
work and bringing the employees from the South."57
William Green, president of the AFL, made it clear that what 
the union's interests were: "[C]olored labor is being sought to 
demoralize wage rates [in Tennessee]58.
Ralph C. Thomas, executive director of the National Association 
55Hours of Labor and Wages on Public Works, Hearings before the 
Committee on Labor, House of Representatives, 69th Congress, 2nd 
session, February 28, 1927, p. 3.
56Hours of Labor and Wages on Public Works, Hearings before the 
Committee on Labor, House of Representatives, 69th Congress, 2nd 
Session, February 28, 1927, p. 3.
57U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Labor. Hearings on H.R. 
7995 & H.R. 9232, 71st Congress, 2nd Session, March 6, 1930, pp. 26-
27. 
58Wages of Laborers and Mechanics on Public Buildings, Hear-
ings, House, Committee on Manufacturers, 71st Congress, 3rd Session, 
March 10, 1931, pp.????????
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of Minority Contractors, lamented that a contractor has "no choice 
but to hire skilled tradesmen, the majority of which are majority 
[white]. . . .  Davis-Bacon. . . closes the door in such activity in 
an industry most capable of employing the largest numbers of minori-
ties."59  Government paperwork requirements for compliance with the 
Davis-Bacon Act also hampers small contractors. Unlike major 
contractors, small contractors typically do not have attorneys and 
personnel with the expertise necessary for paperwork compliance. 
This confers a competitive advantage to larger, and usually union-
ized, contractors who do have the resources.60
According to Vedder and Galloway, prior to the enactment of the 
Davis-Bacon Act, black and white construction unemployment was 
similar.  After the enactment of the Davis-Bacon Act, black unem-
ployment rose relative to that of whites.61   Vedder and Galloway 
also argue that the period 1930 to 1950 was a period of 
unprecedented, rapidly increasing government intervention into the 
economy.  It was during this period that the bulk of legislation 
restraining private wage setting was enacted, such as: the Fair 
Labor Standards Act, the Davis-Bacon Act, the Walsh-Healey Act, and 
59Testimony by the National Association of Minority Contrac-
tors, House Subcommittee on Labor Standards of the Committee on 
Education and Labor, September 30, 1986, p. 3.
60Patrick Barry, "Congress's Deconstruction Theory," The Wash-
ington Monthly  (January 1990), pp. 12-13.
61Richard Vedder and Lowell Galloway, Racial Dimensions of the 
Davis-Bacon Act, Heritage Foundation (November 1990).
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the National Labor Relations Act.  The Social Security Act also 
played a role by forcing employers to pay a fringe benefit not 
previously provided.62Vedder and Galloway also note that it was 
during this period that saw a rapid increase in the black/white 
unemployment ratio.
Conclusions
In today’s America there is a broad consensus that race-based 
discrimination in many activities is morally offensive and in many 
cases rightfully illegal as it should be when there is taxpayer-
based provision of goods and services such as public schools and 
universities, libraries, social services and the like.  Even though 
people should be free to deal with, or refuse to deal with, anyone 
in strictly private matters, there is little evidence that race-
based discrimination would be widespread in today’s America.  After 
all there is a difference between what people can do and what they 
will find it in their interest to do.  That this is the case is 
suggested by laws that once codified racial discrimination in the 
United States and elsewhere.  In the U.S. there were 
antimiscegenation laws and restrictive covenants.  During South 
Africa’s apartheid era there were job reservation laws and laws that 
reserved certain amenities such as theaters, restaurants and hotels 
for white use only.  One of the first implications of the existence 
62Richard K. Vedder & Lowell E. Galloway, Out of Work: 
Unemployment and Government in Twentieth-Century America  (New York: 
Holmes & Meier), 1993, pp. 279-80.
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of a law is that not everyone would voluntarily behave according to 
the specifications of the law.  If they would then there would be no 
need for the law.  After all, there is no law, to the writer’s 
knowledge, that mandates that people shall eat or people shall not 
toss their weekly earnings onto the street.  While in both cases 
people are free to not eat and they can toss their weekly earnings 
onto the street, we need not worry because most will not find it in 
their private interest to do so.
For people concerned about issues dealing with race might focus 
more attention on those governmental activities that subsidize 
preference indulgence.  We have discussed the minimum wage law and 
the Davis-Bacon Act, but there are others: such as occupational and 
business licensing laws, union monopolies, rent controls, and other 
legal restrictions on peaceable, voluntary exchange.
*******************
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